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A Gift is not Always a Gift: 





Different from traditional gift exchange experiments, we study a field experiment where a 
random subsample of participants in the Swiss Labor Force Survey was sent vouchers to be 
used in adult training courses. Importantly for our purposes, actual voucher redemption can be 
traced. This gives the unique opportunity to study whether gift exchange in the form of 
participation in future rounds of the survey depends on the perceived usefulness of the gift. 
We find that the group of voucher recipients as a whole has significantly higher response rates 
in the survey six months after the vouchers were sent out. There is considerable heterogeneity, 
though. Our results point to a long-lasting gift exchange relationship for the sub-group that 
had redeemed their vouchers. Contrary to this group, the individuals who did not redeem their 
vouchers, had a response pattern that was not significantly different from the voucher non-
recipients. 
JEL-Code: C420, C930, Z130. 
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In January 2006, a random subsample of 2,400 individuals who had participated
in the year 2005 round of the Swiss Labor Force Survey (Swiss LFS) was sent a
letter from the Swiss Federal Statistical Oce. The letter, signed by the Director
General of the Swiss Federal Statistical Oce, contained a voucher that could be
redeemed in any training activities of the recipient's choice. The letter stated that
the voucher was part of a project to promote lifelong learning by the Federal Oce
for Professional Education and Training and that participants of the Swiss LFS
were particularly well suited to receive this gift. The voucher could be redeemed
for any ongoing or future training activity under the condition that the training
started before the end of May 2006. In order to redeem their vouchers, recipients
had to send proof of payment for training activities together with their voucher to
the Swiss Federal Oce for Professional Education and Technology. The take-up
behavior of vouchers for participation in training activities is analyzed elsewhere
(see Messer and Wolter, 2009) and shows that voucher recipients had an almost
20% higher training incidence than non-recipients.
Our interest in this paper is the survey response behavior in the Swiss Labor
Force Survey in the summer 2006 and 2007, i.e. after the end of the voucher
experiment. The Swiss LFS is structured according to a rotating panel principle
in which the respondents are interviewed for ve consecutive years. As a result,
about one-fth of the respondent population is replaced every year. Participation
in the Swiss Labor Force Survey is voluntary and past respondents are not obliged
to answer in subsequent rounds of the survey. Since the voucher was explicitly
linked to past survey participation, voucher recipients might have been tempted
to reciprocate towards the Swiss Federal Statistical Oce by further active sur-
vey participation. It is important to note that the voucher experiment was not
aimed at increasing survey participation,1 so increased survey participation is an
incidental by-product of the voucher experiment analyzed in Messer and Wolter
(2009).
The advantage of our setup is that it constitutes a natural experiment, not an
articial experiment explicitly designed for the purpose of studying gift exchange.
Our eld data rather ows naturally from an ongoing survey and participants
are not aware of being part of an experiment. Furthermore, we are outside a
classical employer-employee setting with a formal contract between two parties,
where the agent might perceive a wage increase (or a non-monetary gift) as an
1We discuss the literature on survey participation in Section 4.2.4.
2invitation to enter a multi-stage game in which a worker's productivity increase
will elicit further wage increases. In contrast, participants in the Swiss Labor
Force Survey face a rather anonymous counterpart in form of the Swiss Federal
Statistical Oce and have no contractual obligation to participate in the survey.
Higher participation rates for voucher recipients in future survey rounds are thus
likely to constitute cleaner evidence on gift exchange because strategic motives
can largely be excluded. In fact, we exploit the rotating panel nature of the Swiss
Labour Force Survey and show that participants who are rotating out of survey
participation have higher participation rates in their last survey round although
they cannot expect to be contacted again.
A growing literature studies the relevance of reciprocity and gift exchange
to understand patterns of interaction (see Fehr and G achter, 2000, for an early
overview). Initially, these issues were studied in laboratory experiments (e.g. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993, Fehr, G achter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997). Recently,
several papers have analyzed gift exchange in eld experiments. Gneezy and List
(2006) study gift exchange at the workplace where in the \gift condition" wages
were higher than previously announced (20 Dollars instead of 10 Dollars). They
report that initially output is higher in the gift condition than in the no gift
condition, but that over the work period of six hours the gift exchange relation
eventually breaks down. Their study thus points to relatively short-lived gift
exchanges.2 Our study allows us to follow survey participants 6 months and 18
months after the initial gift (the training voucher). We nd gift exchange even
after 18 months for the group that had redeemed their vouchers, pointing to rather
long-run eects.
In experiments that involve monetary gifts, e.g. higher wages in labor market
experiments, the implicit assumption is that recipients attach a value to the gift.
In settings with non-pecuniary gifts,3 it is usually not possible to see whether
recipients appreciate the gift. Falk (2007) studied the response to the Christmas
mailing of a charity soliciting money, where some potential donors were randomly
sent a \small" or a \large" gift. The small gift was one postcard plus envelope,
2Similarly short-lived eects are found by Bellemare and Shearer (2009) in a eld experiment
in a tree-planting rm. In contrast, Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh (2009) do not
nd any productivity eect of an unanticipated pay rise for students performing eld work as
typists.
3Dierences between pecuniary and non pecuniary gifts have also been tested in eld exper-
iments. Al-Ubaydli et al. (2008) nd in a workplace experiment that reactions to both types
of incentives are rather similar. However, Kube, Mar echal and Puppe (2010) nd that a non-
pecuniary gift shows a substantial increase in workers' productivity, whereas the reaction to a
cash gift is ineective although workers favour to receive the non-pecuniary gift's cash equivalent.
3while the large gift consisted of a set of four postcards with four envelopes. The
postcards showed colored paintings drawn by children. He nds gift-exchange to
matter: the donation probability is lowest in the no gift condition, higher in the
small gift condition, and highest in the large gift condition.
This design might hide further important heterogeneity because some members
in the treatment group might not have even opened the letter from the charity or
might have disposed of the postcards right away, not perceiving them to be a gift.
The donation probability is likely to vary by the perception of the intended gift as
a gift. Falk (2007) notes in his conclusion: \Ultimately the successful initiation of
a gift-exchange relation depends on attribution, that is, how kind, generous, or fair
a particular action or gift is perceived by the recipient.4 A unique feature of our
experimental design is that our setup allows us to distinguish between recipients
that actually redeemed their training voucher and those who did not. We can
thus analyze the degree of gift exchange as a function of the perceived utility of
the gift, and we will be able to show that this distinction signicantly alters the
way one has to interpret the results of a gift exchange experiment.
Our paper thus contributes to the literature in several respects: rst, and
most importantly, the voucher experiment allows us to study reciprocity in an
experimental setting in the eld. It thus adds to a small but growing literature
studying gift exchange outside standard laboratory experiments. Second, dierent
from the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to study the long-
run eects of gift exchange from \memorable" gifts. Third, we address the issue of
attribution by analyzing dierences between voucher recipients who redeem their
training vouchers and those who do not.
Empirically, a challenge arises from the fact that voucher recipients who re-
deem their voucher and those who do not might systematically dier. In other
words, whereas our experimental setting ensures that voucher recipients and non-
recipients do not systematically dier, there is likely to be self-selection into train-
ing participation. To address this issue, we pursue a careful matching procedure
to identify suitable control observations from the group of voucher-non-recipients.
Furthermore, to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity between the treat-
4In a similar vein, potential survey respondents are routinely given nancial incentives to
increase participation (see Laurie and Lynn 2008). Financial incentives typically take the form
of banknotes sent along in the envelope containing the questionnaire or may come as vouchers
that can be redeemed in high street stores. For instance, the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) sends respondents $10 gift vouchers as a token of thanks (see Laurie 2007). These
vouchers can be redeemed in 19,000 stores across Britain, the implicit assumption being that
the vouchers are equivalent to cash and cash enters people's utility function positively, but their
actual use is not followed up.
4ment and control groups, we perform a statistical bounding analysis to assess how
inuential unobserved factors would have to be to overturn our ndings.
Our results show that voucher recipients have a signicantly higher response
rate than non-recipients by 5 percentage points in the rst survey round after
vouchers were sent out, but no eect is found in the second survey round 18
months after the initial gift. However, the results change remarkably once we dis-
tinguish between voucher recipients who do not redeem their vouchers, and voucher
recipients who do redeem their vouchers. Voucher recipients who redeemed their
vouchers before the expiry date have a signicantly higher response rate than non-
recipients by 25 percentage points in the rst survey round and by 14 percentage
points in the second survey round, pointing to long-lasting gift exchange eects
six and eighteen months after the initial gift. In contrast, survey respondents who
received the same training gift vouchers, but did not redeem them, show no dif-
ference in survey response rates compared to non-recipients. This suggests that
the perception of the initial gift matters for the degree of gift exchange.
Our results might extend beyond our particular setting. Further training
plays an important role in employer-employee relations and some rms consider
employer-nanced training as a gift substituting for a monetary bonus, or count
on high degrees of reciprocity of those workers they invested in (see Leuven et
al. 2005). If one accounts for the insight created by our experiment, workers'
productivity might react quite dierently depending on the perceived usefulness
of the oer of continuous training.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we
present the details of the eld experiment. Our empirical strategy is described in
Section 3, results are contained in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The experimental design
In 2005 the Swiss government mandated the Centre for Research in Economics of
Education at the University of Bern to conduct a large scale, randomized eld ex-
periment with vouchers for adult education. In order to get a sucient number of
individuals for the experimental and for the control group, the research team had
the chance to benet from a planned reduction in the sample size in the Swiss La-
bor Force Survey. The Swiss LFS sample population had been raised signicantly
in the year 2002, but was scheduled to be reduced in subsequent years because of
nancial constraints. The Swiss LFS is structured according to a rotating panel
principle in which the respondents are interviewed for ve consecutive years. The
5nancially induced reduction in the sample yielded the opportunity to select a
random sample of 2,437 individuals who would otherwise have been dropped from
future LFS rounds. For the purpose of the experiment, they were interviewed as
if they continued to be part of the Swiss LFS. All individuals in the experimental
group had been interviewed in the 2005 Swiss LFS, and most of them had also
been interviewed in former years.
The experimental group was matched by a control group of 17,234 individuals
who were interviewed by the Swiss LFS in 2005 and were scheduled to be inter-
viewed again in 2006. The experimental design enables the use of longitudinal and
cross-sectional information.
The only limitation that was imposed on the experimental sample refers to their
age. Only subjects aged 20 to 60 were entitled to receive vouchers, since under-20s
would be likely to be still undergoing education or training, and over-60s would be
likely to be retired pensioners. There were no restrictions concerning employment
status, as increasing the skills of non-employed and employed individuals was
potentially a goal of the voucher policy.
The 2,437 randomly selected individuals received a letter from the Swiss Fed-
eral Statistical Oce during the rst days of January 2006 containing an adult
education voucher (see Appendix). The letter stated that the voucher was part of
a project to promote lifelong learning by the Federal Oce for Professional Edu-
cation and Training and that participants of the Swiss LFS were particularly well
suited to receive this gift. In order to eliminate any doubts as to the legitimacy
of the voucher, the letter was signed by the Director General of the Swiss Federal
Statistical Oce. No public-domain information was generated during the experi-
mental period, to ensure that voucher recipients were unaware that the dispensing
of the voucher was part of a eld experiment.5
The voucher group was further split up according to the face value of the
voucher. Vouchers had face values of 200 CHF, 750 CHF or 1,500 CHF (see
Table 1), quite substantial amounts compared to other gifts used in the literature
like postcards or 10 Pound banknotes. In our analysis, we look into the eect of
voucher receipt as such, but can also analyze whether the face value of the voucher
matters for the degree of gift exchange.
We exclude from our sample those survey participants that the interviewing
agency was not able to locate anymore due to change of name, migration or death.
5The aspect that participants were unaware that they were participating in an experiment {
usually dicult to achieve { is common practice in eld experiments; see, for example, Gneezy
and List (2006).
6Table 1: Division of the experimental group (number of observations)
Face value: 200 CHFa 750 CHF 1,500 CHF Total
Advice
Yes 408 407 404 1,219
No 407 407 404 1,218
Total 815 814 808 2,437
Source: Messer and Wolter (2009).
a 1 CHF is equivalent to about 0.93 USD or 0.66 EUR.
Although sample attrition due to these reasons should aect the experimental and
the control group randomly and therefore similarly, there might be non-random dif-
ferences within the experimental group. The reason for voucher non-redemption,
e.g. migration, might have been exactly the same as the one that lead to the sam-
ple attrition. Therefore, excluding those participants prevents a potential bias.
Out of the 2,437 individuals receiving adult education vouchers, 354 could not be
contacted anymore. In the control group 1,985 addresses out of the initial 17,234
could not be found anymore or were inactive.
Furthermore, for organizational reasons, the interview period was not identical
for voucher-recipients and non-recipients. Voucher recipients were rst contacted
in June in order to guarantee a maximum voucher redemption period in the year
2006. Due to the large sample size of the Swiss LFS, the sample agency split the
main LFS sample randomly into two groups for the interview every year. Half of
the voucher non-recipients were rst contacted in April and the remaining non-
recipients were rst contacted in May. They were all contacted at least once within
the rst two weeks of the respective month and there were further attempts to
establish contact with voucher recipients during a maximum period of 70 days
and 90 days with non-recipients. As the Swiss summer vacation lasts from July
to mid-August, the Swiss LFS interview period overlapped with the summer va-
cation. Only the rst month of the voucher recipients' interview period was prior
to the vacation while in case of non-recipients either the whole interview period or
two months did not overlap with the vacation.6 To guarantee comparability of the
6Figure 1 (see Appendix) shows the cumulative response rates of voucher-recipients, non-
recipients and of their matched controls in the years 2006 and 2007. The cumulative response
rate of voucher-recipients persisted on a higher level than the rate of their matched controls,
whereas for non-recipients the cumulative response rate falls below the rate of their matched
controls after the rst month since the beginning of the interviewing period. This is because
the response rate in the remaining period is inuenced by the fact that the interviewing of
the voucher recipients is done during the period of the national summer holidays, whereas the
interviewing of most of the control group had already been completed by then.
7response rates, we limit the observed contacting period for our subsequent anal-
ysis to the rst month of interviews. Consequently, responses are coded 1 if the
interview was successfully administered within the rst four weeks of interviews
and zero otherwise.
The response rate of voucher recipients was 71.9% in the year 2006 and 64.7%
in 2007, respectively. 66.6% of voucher non-recipients responded in the year 2006
and 63.3% in 2007, respectively.
3 Empirical Strategy
As vouchers were randomly assigned to survey participants, the comparison of
the survey response rates between the treatment group (voucher receivers) and
the control group (voucher non-receivers) establishes experimental evidence on
gift-exchange. We are further interested in the dierence in the degree of reci-
procity between voucher recipients who appreciated the gift (voucher redeemers)
and those who made not use of it (voucher non-redeemers) and therefore split
the treatment group into these two distinct groups. However, voucher redeemers
and non-redeemers might dier systematically. There is indeed clear evidence of
heterogeneity between voucher recipients who redeemed their vouchers and those
who did not, as Table 2 shows. For instance, females, holders of a non-academic
tertiary degree, and training participants in the year before the voucher receipt
are more likely to redeem their vouchers.
This heterogeneity in characteristics of those who redeemed their vouchers
(voucher & redeem group) and those who did not (voucher & don't redeem group)
implies that the comparison of the random control group with the combined treat-
ment group does not give experimental evidence on gift exchange, as individuals
are not randomly allocated to the two sub-groups of the treatment group. Raw
comparisons of survey participation rates in 2006 and 2007 between the voucher &
redeem group and the full control group will therefore not correctly measure the
degree of reciprocity of those who appreciated the gift because the control group
is made up of both types. The same is true for raw outcome comparisons between
the voucher & don't redeem group and the full control group.
In order to ensure comparability between individuals in the two disjunct treat-
ment groups and those in the control group, we use propensity score matching
(see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; for a survey, see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
Matching serves to select, in two separate analyses, suitable control groups for
the two treatment groups. While the Appendix gives a more detailed overview of
8Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Voucher Voucher
redeemed not redeemed
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Age 40.91 9.89 41.94 10.35
Indic.: Female .64 .48 .54 .50
Indic.: Swiss nationality .91 .29 .88 .32
Indic.: Course participation in 2005a .62 .47 .41 .49
Indic.: Non-employed .14 .35 .17 .38
Indic.: French/Italian speaking area .22 .41 .30 .46
Indic.: Education: Compulsory school .07 .26 .15 .36
Indic.: Education: Vocational training .44 .50 .52 .50
Indic.: Education: Maturab .11 .31 .09 .29
Indic.: Education: Non-academic tertiary degreec .25 .43 .15 .35
Indic.: Education: University .13 .34 .10 .30
Indic.: Place of residence: city .24 .43 .24 .42
Indic.: Place of residence: suburban area .51 .50 .44 .50
Indic.: Place of residence: rural area .25 .43 .32 .47
Number of Observations 427 1,656
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005 and 2006, and experimental data. Indicator variables (Indic.) take a value
of one if the described condition is satised.
a Course participation in the year before voucher assignment.
b University-entry certicate.
c Degree at university of applied sciences or professional education and training at tertiary level.
propensity score matching, here we concentrate on the essential features.
Intuitively, for individuals in the voucher & redeem group, suitable controls
will be those who would have the same (or very close) propensity of redeeming
their voucher should they receive one.7 Similarly, for individuals in the voucher &
don't redeem group, suitable controls will be those who would have the same (or
very close) propensity of not redeeming their voucher should they receive one.
We then estimate the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT), i.e. we
compare the average outcome in the voucher & redeem group to the average out-
come of those controls that have been matched to the voucher & redeem group.
Similarly, we compare the average outcome in the voucher & don't redeem group
to the average outcome of those controls that have been matched to the voucher
& don't redeem group. These outcome dierences are average treatment eects on
the treated (see the Appendix for details).
Propensity-score matching removes the bias of non-random selection into treat-
ment by comparing outcomes between treated and control units that are initially
7We employ single nearest-neighbor matching, i.e. we match treated individuals to that
control unit with the closest propensity score.
9identical and undergo treatment (receive a voucher). A crucial assumption is
that observable covariates exhaustively determine selection into treatment. Since
receipt of the voucher is randomized, this assumption is equivalent to assuming
that redemption of the voucher is exhaustively determined by observed covariates.
The wealth of information in our data|individual characteristics such as demo-
graphic, education and work variables, as well as controls for region of residence|
comprehensively covers the pre-treatment conditions so that the assumption of
selection on observables is not unreasonable. Still, to address remaining worries of
selection on unobservables, we will calculate so-called Rosenbaum (2002) bounds
to investigate how strong unobservable factors would have to be to overturn our
results. That bounding analysis will show that unobservables would have to be un-
reasonably inuential in order to change our ndings. We discuss these extensions
in Appendix A.4.
4 Results
Let us rst consider the situation in which { similar to the existing literature {
we would not have been able to observe the redemption of the vouchers. In this
experimental situation, we would have only been able to compare the combined
treatment group (all voucher recipients) with the control group (all voucher non-
recipients). The results (see Table 3) show a signicant average treatment eect
on the treated (ATT) for all voucher values combined (rst line) in the year 2006
survey, i.e. 6 months after the vouchers were sent out, and no signicant eects
in the year 2007 survey, i.e. after 18 months. We might interpret these results
as evidence of gift exchange in the medium run (6 months after the original gift),
but no gift exchange in the long-run (after 18 months).
Looking at dierent subgroups of voucher recipients by voucher value, these
results are driven by a strong response by those receiving vouchers with high face
value (750 or 1500 CHF) with no eect on those receiving a 200 CHF voucher.
Lacking knowledge about voucher redemption, we would not have been able
to get further insight into dierences in gift exchange behavior depending on how
the voucher recipient values the gift.
We will now show that, based on the evidence for the combined treatment
group, the interpretation of the eect size, of the duration of reciprocity as well
as of strategic behavior would have been inadequate. The reason is that there is a
signicant dierence in the pattern of reaction to the vouchers between the group
of individuals who redeemed their vouchers and those who did not.
10Table 3: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
2006 2007
ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
Treatment group: voucher received
Voucher .053 .015 -.003 .018
Voucher 200 .010 .025 .034 .031
Voucher 750 .072 .025 .026 .029
Voucher 1500 .064 .025 -.004 .029
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and experimental data.
Note: ATT denotes the average treatment eect on the treated. See main text for details.
4.1 The importance of accounting for heterogeneity
We present results separately for voucher recipients that redeem their voucher
(voucher & redeem group) and voucher recipients that do not redeem their vouch-
ers (voucher & don't redeem group). Table 4 displays odds ratios and corre-
sponding standard errors of logit propensity score estimates where the dependent
variable is equal to one for voucher recipients that do redeem their vouchers. The
control group is composed of all voucher non-recipients. The results indicate that
older workers, women, those with education beyond compulsory education, those
having participated in a course the year before the voucher assignment and from
the German-speaking areas of Switzerland are more likely to redeem their vouch-
ers.
We also run separate specications according to voucher value. In all specica-
tions, the control group before matching is composed of all voucher non-recipients.8
Before proceeding to the estimation of average treatment eects, we assess
matching quality, i.e. we assess whether propensity score matching was successful
in selecting individuals from the control group that are good matches to individuals
in the voucher & redeem and voucher & dont't redeem group, respectively. Our
two indicators of matching quality, the pseudo- R2 of the propensity score logit
regression and the median absolute standardized bias, indicate that observable
characteristics of treated and matched control observations are well balanced after
propensity-score matching (see Appendix for details).
A further interesting nding supporting our matching strategy is that the cu-
mulative survey response rates of the two matched control groups (see Appendix,
Figure 1) are nearly identical. This implies that { after controlling for observable
8To save on space, we do not display the further propensity score specications.
11Table 4: Propensity Score Specification
Dependent variable: voucher received and redeemed
Odds Ratio Std. Err.
Age 1.023 .042
Age-squared 1.000 .0005
Indic.: Female 1.705 .183
Indic.: Swiss nationality 1.364 .240y
Indic.: Course participation in 2005a 1.687 .178
Indic.: Non-employed .992 .149
Indic.: French/Italian speaking area .483 .058
Education variables: reference category \compulsory schooling"
Indic.: Education: Vocational training 1.590 .324
Indic.: Education: Maturab 2.094 .508
Indic.: Education: Non-academic tertiary degreec 2.755 .609
Indic.: Education: University 1.964 .470
Residence variables: reference category \rural area"
Indic.: Place of residence: city .871 .127
Indic.: Place of residence: suburban area 1.145 .139
Marital status, child controls yes
Rotating panel controlsd yes
Obs. 15,666
Pseudo R2 .050
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and experimental data. Indicator variables (Indic.) take
a value of one if the described condition is satised.
a Course participation in the year before voucher assignment.
b University-entry certicate.
c Degree at university of applied sciences or professional education and training.
d Controls for year in which respondent was rst interviewed in the Swiss Labor Force Survey.
factors that inuence voucher redemption { the control group for the voucher &
redeem group and the control group for the voucher & dont't redeem show very
similar response patterns in subsequent survey rounds. This result, which could
not have been known prior to the matching exercise, is interesting for at least two
reasons. First, it means that although the voucher-redeemers and non-redeemers
dier substantially based on their observable characteristics, these dierences do
not seem to be relevant for the explanation of dierences in the survey response
patterns. Second, it also suggests that, if such observables like gender, education,
age, etc. have no discernible inuence on the response rates, it is hard to imagine
which unobservables might then still dier between the voucher redeemers and
non-redeemers that could have a substantial inuence on the response behavior,
12except the fact that one group valued the gift and the other group did not.
However, after presenting the results from the ATT estimation, to test the
sensitivity of our results with respect to hypothetical unobserved factors, we will
use Rosenbaum (2002) bounds.
Average treatment eects Having formed a matched sample of treated voucher
redeemers and control individuals, we estimate the ATT. Table 5 shows that, in
the summer 2006 wave of the Swiss Labor Force Survey, i.e. half a year after
the vouchers were randomly assigned, the voucher recipients that redeemed their
voucher have a survey response probability in the rst four weeks of the inter-
viewing period that is 25.5 percentage points higher than for comparable voucher
non-recipients. After one-and-a-half years, in the summer 2007 round of the Swiss
LFS, it is still 14.1 percentage points higher than for the control group of voucher
non-recipients. These are very sizeable numbers that point to large and long-
lasting eects of receiving the voucher gift and making use of it. The eect varies
surprisingly little by voucher value.9 In fact, for those who redeem their voucher,
the response rates are uniformly higher across all voucher values. Survey respon-
dents seem to attach value to the usefulness of a voucher, but reciprocity does not
vary by voucher size.10
Remember that the vouchers with dierent values had been distributed ran-
domly within the experimental group. This sheds new light on the results in in
Table 3 for the treatment group as a whole (i.e. not distinguishing between those
who redeem and those who don't redeem their vouchers). There, we found higher
response rates for those with higher voucher values. Since, as we just discussed in
the context of Table 5, reciprocity conditional on voucher redemption does not vary
by voucher value, the higher survey response rates for those with higher voucher
values can solely be attributed to the fact that the vouchers with higher values
had higher redemption rates.11 Given the fact that the voucher value as such has
9This particular nding is dierent from Falk (2007) who nds a signicantly higher degree
of reciprocity for more generous gifts (four Christmas cards instead of one). There might be
decreasing \returns" to gifts in the sense that for small amounts (cash equivalent of a Christmas
card), getting four times as much makes a large dierence whereas for large amounts (value of
200 CHF for lowest face value of voucher are nearly 200 US Dollars) getting even more does not
further increase the intensity of gift exchange.
10Note that recipients of a 200 CHF voucher do not know that other LFS respondents received
vouchers of higher value and may be equally \thankful" of having received such a sizeable voucher
at all.
11In fact, as shown by Messer and Wolter (2009), voucher redemption rates are increasing
with voucher value. The redemption rate for vouchers with a face value of CHF 200 was 12.6%,
whereas the redemption rate for CHF 750 and CHF 1500 vouchers was 21.0% and 21.7%, re-
spectively.
13no impact on the survey response rates but only on the redemption rates, the ran-
domization of voucher values within the treatment group provides clean evidence
that it is the redemption of the voucher that triggers the reciprocity.
The heterogeneity between those who redeem their voucher and those who
don't, comes out clearly by looking at our second treatment group: voucher re-
cipients who do not redeem their voucher. This group still exhibits slightly higher
response rates in the 2006 round of the Swiss LFS than do comparable voucher
non-recipients, but the dierence is statistically insignicant. In the 2007 round,
their response rates are lower than that of comparable non-recipients, but again
the dierence is statistically insignicant.
Whereas their response rates are indistinguishable from voucher non-recipients,
they are considerably and signicantly lower than those of voucher recipients that
redeemed their vouchers. The voucher & don't redeem group thus exhibits a
signicantly lower degree of reciprocity (in fact zero) than the voucher & redeem
group, a key nding of our study. The previous literature was not able to identify
the value attached to a gift by the recipient. Our results point to considerable
heterogeneity between those that value a gift and those that do not.
Table 5: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
2006 2007
ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
Voucher & redeem group
Voucher .255 .028 .141 .034
Voucher 200 .255 .061 .163 .072
Voucher 750 .303 .044 .144 .053
Voucher 1500 .244 .045 .118 .054
Voucher & don't redeem group
Voucher .021 .017 -.012 .021
Voucher 200 .010 .028 -.018 .033
Voucher 750 .026 .029 .017 .034
Voucher 1500 -.058 .029 -.057 .035
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and experimental data.
Note: ATT denotes the average treatment eect on the treated. See main text for details.
144.2 Interpretation of the results
4.2.1 Gift exchange versus individual-specic motivation
A potential threat to our interpretation could be that the response rate patterns
are the result of explanations other than a gift exchange. One such alternative
explanation could be that those who redeem a voucher are more motivated in-
dividuals who are more likely to participate in training activities (and use their
voucher for that purpose) and, at the same time, are also more likely to partici-
pate in future survey rounds of the Swiss LFS. Note that several of our observable
variables already try to control for these motivational dierences: the dummy
for course participation in 2005, the year before vouchers were assigned, mea-
sures previous training activities, for example, and to some extent captures such
individual-specic traits.
But we can go one step further and test this alternative explanation by es-
timating the ATT only for the subsample of interviewees who had already been
actively participating in continuous education in the year 2005. As Table 6 shows,
the ATT is almost identical as in the rst specication, indicating that the activity
in continuous education is not likely to be the factor that explains the dierences
in the survey response rates.
4.2.2 Gift exchange versus strategic motives
The second alternative explanation we test for is the possibility that people re-
spond to the survey not as an exchange for the initial gift, but out of strategic
motives to secure the receipt of future vouchers. It is important to note that, as
a matter of fact, our voucher experiment was the rst and last time any kind of
voucher was sent out to survey participants of the Swiss LFS. So, dierent from
many household surveys where respondents are used to receiving small gifts to
increase survey participation, the training vouchers came as a surprise to partic-
ipants of the Swiss Labor Force Survey. Still, survey participants did not know
for sure whether the sending of vouchers was a one-time gift or whether vouchers
might now be a new regular feature, hence strategic motives are potentially an
issue.
We can address the issue of strategic motives by exploiting the rotating panel
structure of the Swiss LFS. Remember that participation in the Swiss LFS is for
ve consecutive years and that vouchers were sent out to a randomized group of
individuals who had responded to the LFS in the year 2005. So, in 2006 there are
no rst-time respondents, but respondents are in their second, third, fourth or last
15Table 6: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
2006 2007
ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
Voucher & redeem group
Voucher .255 .028 .141 .034
Participation in Swiss LFS 2006
second time .234 .048 .125 .057
third time .298 .054 .119 .060
fourth time .245 .065 .000 .089
last time .135 .055 { {
Voucher & don't redeem group
Voucher .021 .017 -.012 .021
Participation in Swiss LFS 2006
second time -.031 .029 -.108 .035
third time -.017 .031 .005 .036
fourth time -.014 .044 .017 .051
last time -.003 .037 { {
Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and experimental data.
Note: ATT denotes the average treatment eect on the treated. See main text for details.
year of LFS participation. We can look at how response rates dier for respondents
who only entered the Swiss LFS in 2005 and compare this to \experienced" LFS
respondents. Furthermore, the group rotating out of the Swiss LFS is of particular
interest as well. This is the group for whom the 2006 interview (i.e. after voucher
receipt) is the last interview. Table 6 shows the ATT separately for response rates
of survey respondents for whom the 2006 is their second, third, fourth or last LFS
interview.
Only those respondents who had participated in the Swiss LFS for the rst
time in 2005 (and for whom the 2006 survey was their second round) might have
been tempted to think that gifts in between survey waves could be a regular
feature. To respondents who had been surveyed for the second, third or fourth
time in 2005 the voucher gift must have come as a surprise. Interestingly, the
ATT of voucher recipients who are \newcomers" (.234 with a standard error of
.048) does not signicantly dier from that of voucher recipients for whom the
2006 round was their third interview (.298 with a standard error of .054) or fourth
interview (.245 with a standard error of .065). While this evidence is consistent
with a gift exchange interpretation, it does not exclude strategic motives in so
far as both newcomers and experienced LFS respondents might have acted in the
16hope of future rewards
Further evidence draws on respondents for whom 2006 is denitely their last
round of LFS participation. This group of survey participants knew that in 2006
they would be interviewed for the last time and could not expect to receive new
vouchers in the future. Although the ATT for people that participated for the last
time in the Swiss LFS in 2006 is lower than for people that more recently joined
the LFS population, Table 6 shows that the response rates of this subgroup in the
voucher & redeem group is still signicantly higher than the one of the control
group. Furthermore the coecient (.135) is not statistically signicantly dierent
from the one measuring participation for the fourth time (.245).
Although this result does not completely exclude strategic behavior, it contra-
dicts the hypothesis that the dierences in the response patterns between control
and treatment group are the result of exclusively explained by strategic behavior
to secure future vouchers.12
4.2.3 Gift exchange versus residual heterogeneity
Still, a remaining potential threat to our empirical strategy is that those who
redeem their voucher and those who do not might dier in unobservable ways that
matter for response rates. To address remaining worries of any sort of unobserved
heterogeneity between our treatment groups and the control group, we perform
a sensitivity analysis. We use Rosenbaum (2002) bounds to estimate how large
the eect of a hypothetically unobserved confounding factor would have to be to
overturn our ATT estimate (see Appendix A.4 for a detailed description).
Note that for an unobserved variable to be a source of selection bias, it must
aect the probability that an individual redeems the voucher and must aect the
outcome. In particular, an unobserved variable that dierentially aects subgroups
of voucher recipients in the treatment group, but that does not have an eect on
the outcome beyond the variables already controlled for, does not challenge the
robustness of our results. Examples of such variables are motivational dierences
as just mentioned. Only if groups of individuals dier on unobserved variables
that simultaneously aect the assignment to treatment and the outcome, a hidden
bias may arise on unobserved heterogeneity. We want to determine how strongly
a hypothetical unobserved variable would have to be to inuence the selection
process so that it could undermine the results of our matching analysis.
12Note that, in 2007, the ATT by interview wave has to be interpreted with caution as the
sample size for subsamples of the voucher & redeem group becomes quite small due to attrition
between 2006 and 2007.
17We perform a sensitivity analysis for all statistically signicant ATT eects.
For this purpose, we gradually increase the level of the critical value of the odds
ratio where inference about the treatment eect starts to be overturned. Table 7
displays the critical values for all ATT eects. For the voucher & redeem group,
we nd that the critical value, for which the statistically signicant ATT eects
in Table 5 would become statistically indistinguishable from zero, is well above
3 for most of our ATT estimates. Consider the eect for the voucher & redeem
group when we do not distinguish by voucher amount. We nd the critical odds-
ratio value to be 3.75 in the summer 2006 LFS survey round. This means that all
individuals with the same observed x-vector can dier in their odds of treatment
by a factor of up to 3.75, or 375 percent, before the condence band around the
ATT estimate starts to include zero. This is a worst-case scenario. A critical value
of 3.75 does not imply that there is indeed unobserved heterogeneity or that there
is no eect of treatment on the outcome variable. This result only means that
the condence interval for the eect would include zero if an unobserved variable
caused the odds ratio of treatment assignment to dier between treatment and
control groups by 3.75 and if this variable's eect on the outcome is so strong that
it almost perfectly determines the outcome in each pair of matched cases in the
data. Table 4 gives an idea of what an odds ratio of 3.75 on a hypothetical binary
variable compares to.
The largest numbers in that table are the odds ratios on the indicators of
non-academic tertiary degree (2.755) and matura certicate (2.094), respectively.
The unobserved motivation indicator would thus have to be far more inuen-
tial (e=3.75) than the observed dierence between an individual with compul-
sory schooling (the reference group) and one with a completed tertiary degree
(e=2.755). While we cannot exclude with certainty that such an inuential un-
observed factor exists, we consider it implausible that motivational dierences (for
training participation), or any other unobserved factor outside our list of regres-
sors, would exert such a strong impact on selection in all pairs of treated and
matched controls. We therefore view the statistically signicant ATT eects in
the voucher & redeem group as pretty robust to hidden bias.
On the other hand, when we look at the voucher & don't redeem group, we
nd that the critical value is 1.13 for the only treatment eect that is statistically
signicant to begin with (voucher size 1500 in survey round 2006). The results for
this particular group can therefore not be considered as very robust.
18Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis with Rosenbaum Bounds
c
2006 2007
Voucher & redeem group
Voucher 3.75 1.51
Voucher 200 2.47 1.30
Voucher 750 4.26 1.35
Voucher 1500 2.91 1.20
Voucher & don't redeem group
Voucher ns ns
Voucher 200 ns ns
Voucher 750 ns ns
Voucher 1500 1.13 ns
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and experimental data.
Note: Table displays critical values of the statistically signicant odds ratios e based on the Mantel and Haenszel
(1959) test statistic, as suggested by Rosenbaum (2002); \ns" for non-signicant odds ratios. See Appendix A.4
for details.
4.2.4 Survey-response methodology
Our paper also relates to the methodological literature on how to increase response
rates in surveys. Before discussing this literature, it is important to remind the
reader that our voucher experiment was not designed with the aim of increasing
survey response, but in order to study the role of nancial support (vouchers)
in increasing training participation. As such, our analysis of survey participa-
tion after receipt of training vouchers is an accidental by-product of that voucher
experiment.
The survey methodology literature13 has dealt with various ways to increase
survey response. Underlying this is the assumption that respondents react to in-
centives due to e.g. \social exchange" (see Dillman (1978)). Interestingly, and
related to the discussion about strategic motives above, there seems to be little
concern that respondents will always expect incentives when they have once re-
ceived them (Singer, Van Hoewyk, and Maher (1998); Singer et al. (1999)). As
for the type of incentive, the literature nds larger pecuniary incentives to work
better. Importantly, the range of pecuniary incentives used in household surveys
is several orders of magnitude smaller than in our setup. As mentioned earlier,
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) sends respondents $10 gift vouchers
as a token of thanks (see Laurie 2007). Our training vouchers are worth between
13See e.g. Groves, Dillman, Eltinge and Little (2002) and Stoop, Billet, Koch and Fitzgerald
(2010) for detailed overviews and further references.
19200 Swiss Franks (ca. $140) and 1500 Swiss Franks ($1050).
The fact that in our experiment voucher recipients who do not redeem the
training vouchers have no higher response rate compared to voucher non-recipients
shows that even incentives with extremely high cash-equivalent values will be
ineective if the recipient does not value them.14 To the best of our knowledge,
this is a novel nding in both the gift exchange and survey methodology literatures.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on gift exchange in a unique eld experiment in
which a random subsample of the Swiss Labor Force Survey was sent training
vouchers. Gift exchange comes in the form of voluntary participation in future
rounds of the Swiss LFS. The results show a signicantly higher response rate
for the randomly selected treatment group (voucher recipients) compared to the
control group (voucher non-recipients) in the rst survey round 6 months after
the vouchers were sent out, but no signicant eect in the second survey round
18 months after the initial gift.
Dierent from the existing literature, we can also distinguish between partic-
ipants that redeem their training voucher and those who did not. The dierence
in response rates in future survey rounds between those who redeem the voucher
and those who don't, is substantial and points to considerable heterogeneity: in-
dividuals only reciprocate when they perceive a gift as a (useful) gift.15
A second unique feature of our experimental setting is that we can study gift
exchange in the long run. Typical gift exchange experiments have a horizon of only
several hours or days when studying \long-run" eects. We follow participants 6
and 18 months after the original gift (the training voucher).
Empirically, a challenge arises from the fact that voucher recipients that re-
deem their voucher and those that do not might systematically dier. In other
words, whereas our experimental setting ensures that voucher recipients and non-
recipients do not systematically dier, there is likely to be self-selection into train-
ing participation. To address this issue, we pursue a careful matching procedure
to identify suitable control observations from the group of voucher-non-recipients.
Furthermore, to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity between the treat-
14Remember from footnote 4 that the actual use of gift vouchers is not followed up by survey
agencies.
15Englmaier and Leider (2010) point to a dierent form of heterogeneity in their experiments.
They show that an agent's eort depends not only on the pay received by the agent (the standard
monetary \gift"), but also on the principal's payo.
20ment and control groups, we perform a statistical bounding analysis showing that
unobserved factors would have to be unreasonably large to overturn our ndings.
Our results show that survey response rates of training voucher recipients that
redeem their vouchers exceed response rates of voucher non-recipients by 25 and
14 percentage points in the two survey rounds, half a year and one-and-a-half years
after the voucher experiment, respectively. Voucher recipients that don't redeem
their training vouchers have response rates that are not statistically dierent from
those of non-recipients. The results do not vary much by the value of the voucher.
We show that if we had not been able to separately analyze the gift-exchange
eects for those who value the gift (voucher) and those who did not, the in-
terpretation of the magnitude and the duration of the eect would have been
misleading. In conclusion, it is therefore equally essential for the interpretation
of a gift exchange experiment to know how big the fraction of the treated group
is that perceives the gift as a gift, as it is to know by how much treated people
react to the gift by reciprocating. In all situations of a gift exchange that do not
involve only cash money, this dierentiation is therefore likely to be crucial for the
interpretation of the results.
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Figure 1: Response rates
24A.2 Propensity score matching
We provide a brief methodological discussion in our context. Our estimator mea-
sures the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT) for two interesting treat-
ment groups: those that receive a voucher and nd it benecial (voucher & redeem
group) and those that receive a voucher which they do not redeem (voucher &
don't redeem group). Whereas the voucher & redeem and the voucher & don't
redeem groups combined are randomly drawn from the population, they are not
individually random sub-populations because of the heterogeneity between those
that redeem their vouchers and those that do not. Raw dierences between the
average outcomes in the voucher & redeem group and in the control group there-
fore give biased estimates of the eect of voucher recipience for those who value
a voucher. Propensity-score matching reduces (and ideally removes) this bias. A
crucial assumption is that observable covariates exhaustively determine selection
into treatment. Since receipt of the voucher is randomized, this assumption is
equivalent to assuming that redemption of the voucher is exhaustively determined
by observed covariates. The wealth of information in our data|individual char-
acteristics such as demographic, education and work variables as well as controls
for region of residence|comprehensively covers the pretreatment conditions so
that the assumption of selection on observables is not unreasonable. We address
remaining worries of selection on unobservables by calculating Rosenbaum (2002)
bounds as described in Appendix A.4.
Matching treated units on a vector of characteristics suers dimensionality
problems for large sets of characteristics. Propensity-score matching therefore
summarizes pretreatment characteristics into a scalar, the propensity score. Ex-
posing individuals with the same propensity score value (same ex ante probability
to take training) to random treatment (voucher) eliminates the bias in estimated
treatment eects. Dene the propensity score as the conditional probability of
receiving treatment given pretreatment characteristics,
p(xi)  Pr(di=1jxi) = E[dijxi]; (1)
where di is equal to one for voucher recipients and xi is the vector of pretreatment
characteristics. (We omit time subscripts to save on notation.)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, if the exposure to treatment is ran-
dom within cells dened by xi, it is also random within cells dened by the values
of the scalar propensity score p(xi). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also show that,
25if the propensity score p(xi) is known, the ATT can be dened as
ATT  E[y1i   y0ijdi=1] (2)
= E[E[y1i   y0ijdi=1;p(xi)]]
= E





where outer expectations are over the distribution of p(xi)jdi = 1, and yi is the
outcome taking a value of one i the individual participates in future survey
rounds. To denote the two counterfactual situations of, respectively, treatment and
no treatment, we use shorthand notations y1i  (yijdi =1) and y0i  (yijdi =0).
The derivation of the ATT estimator requires two intermediate results to hold.
First, the pretreatment variables need to be balanced given a valid propensity
score (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), lemma 1): If p(xi) is the propensity score,
then
di ? xi j p(xi): (3)
As a consequence, observations with the same propensity score have the same
distribution of observable characteristics independent of treatment status. Put
dierently, exposure to treatment is random for a given propensity score so that
treated and control individuals are, on average, observationally identical. The or-
thogonality of di and xi conditional on the propensity score is empirically testable.
We perform according balancing tests and compare changes in the goodness of t
for alternative sets of pretreatment variables xi.
Second, the assignment of the treatment needs to be unconfounded conditional
on observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, lemma 2). If assign-
ment to treatment is unconfounded, that is if
y1i;y0i ? di j xi; (4)
then assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity score, that is
y1i;y0i ? di j p(xi): (5)
Equation (4) is a maintained assumption of our method.
We estimate the propensity score Pr(di=1jxi) = F(h(xi)) under the assump-
tion of a logistic cumulative distribution function F(), where h(xi) is, in principle,
a function of linear and higher-order terms of the covariates. We nd linear terms
on our comprehensive set of covariates to suce for balancing (3) to be satised
26and omit higher-order terms.
To implement an estimator for the ATT (2), we use the estimated propensity
scores to pick pairs based on nearest-neighbor matching. Denote by C(i) the
set of control units matched to the treated unit i with an estimated value of
the propensity score of pi. Nearest-neighbor matching assigns C(i)  minj k
pi   pj k, a singleton unless there are ties (multiple nearest neighbors). In the
non-experimental sample, we observe y1i only for treated individuals and y0i for
untreated individuals. The estimator therefore uses yT
i from the treated subsample
as treated outcome and yC
j from the control sample as counterfactual outcome y0i.
We denote the number of controls matched to observation i 2 T by NC
i and dene
weights wij  1=NC
i if j 2 C(i), and wij = 0 otherwise. Then, the nearest neighbor















where NT denotes the number of treated and NC the number of control obser-
vations. Our propensity score estimator is the mean dierence in outcomes over
matched pairs. The specication of h(xi) satises the balancing hypothesis and
is more parsimonious than the full set of interactions needed to match cases and
controls on the basis of observables. The propensity score therefore reduces the
dimensionality problem of matching treated and control units on the basis of the
multidimensional vector xi.16
A.3 Matching quality
Covariate balancing assesses matching quality. Table 8 shows matching quality
indicators. Our rst matching statistic, the pseudo R2 from logit estimation of
the conditional probability of voucher redemption, indicates the degree to which
regressors xi predict the treatment probability (columns 3 and 4). After matching,
regressors xi should have no explanatory power for selection into treatment if the
treatment and matched control samples have balanced characteristics. Our results
show that this is the case. The pseudo R2 statistics drop from 5.0 to 1.0 percent
in the voucher & redeem group when we do not distinguish by voucher value.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) propose a comparison between (standardized)
16It is important to note that the outcome plays no role in the algorithm for the estimation
of the propensity score. This is equivalent, in this context, to what happens in controlled
experiments in which the design of the experiment has to be specied independently of the
outcome.
27Table 8: Covariance Balancing, Before and After Matching
No. of No. of Logit Logit Median Median
treated controls ps. R2 ps. R2 bias bias
before after before after
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2006
Voucher & redeem group
All vouchers 427 15,239 .050 .010 9.896 4.799
Voucher 200 94 15,239 .073 .033 19.237 5.452
Voucher 750 165 15,239 .046 .015 8.630 5.528
Voucher 1500 168 15,239 .045 .012 11.715 5.769
Voucher & don't redeem group
All vouchers 1,656 15,239 .019 .004 2.542 3.018
Voucher 200 592 15,239 .014 .007 4.113 2.925
Voucher 750 532 15,239 .024 .009 3.938 3.444
Voucher 1500 532 15,239 .015 .006 5.110 3.438
2007
Voucher & redeem group
All vouchers 391 10,256 .066 .010 10.165 4.717
Voucher 200 86 10,256 .094 .026 18.906 4.829
Voucher 750 153 10,256 .065 .020 10.657 5.284
Voucher 1500 152 10,256 .054 .025 9.926 5.847
Voucher & don't redeem group
All vouchers 1,276 10,256 .032 .005 3.024 2.344
Voucher 200 451 10,256 .026 .009 5.820 3.981
Voucher 750 418 10,256 .036 .015 5.051 4.503
Voucher 1500 407 10,256 .027 .009 5.911 3.733
Data: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and experimental data.
Note: Column (5) displays Bbefore(xi) and column (6) displays Bafter(xi).
treated unit means and (standardized) control unit means before and after match-
ing as a second evaluation method for covariate balance.17
As is commonly done in the evaluation literature, we show the median abso-
lute standardized bias before (Bbefore(xi)) and after matching (Bafter(xi)), over all
17The standardized dierences (standardized biases) between the means for a covariate xi are
dened as:
Bbefore(xi) = 100 
 xi1    xi0 p
V1(xi) + V2(xi)=2
Bafter(xi) = 100 
 xi1M    xi0M p
V1(xi) + V2(xi)=2
;
where  xi1 denotes the treated unit mean and  xi0 the control unit mean for covariate xi.
28regressors xi that enter the propensity score estimation (columns 5 and 6). In the
main specication, matching reduces the median absolute standardized bias by
three quarters (from 9.896 to 4.799). There seem to be no formal criteria in the
literature to judge the size of standardized bias. Yet the remaining bias between
3 and 6 percent is in the same range as in microeconomic evaluation studies (e.g.
Lechner (2002) and Sianesi (2004)).18
Overall, observable characteristics between treated and control observations
are well balanced after propensity-score matching.
A.4 Rosenbaum bounds for binary outcomes
We outline the idea behind Rosenbaum (2002) bounds. Rewrite the probability
that individual i with observed characteristics xi receives a voucher and redeems
it (treatment 1) or receives a voucher but does not redeem it (treatment 2):
p(xi) = Pr(di=1jxi) = F(xi + ui); (7)
where ui is the unobserved variable of concern (intrinsic motivation, for instance)
and  is the eect of ui on the treatment probability. If the estimator is free
of hidden bias,  is zero and the participation probability is solely determined
by xi. However, if there is hidden bias, two individuals with the same observed
covariates x have diering chances of receiving treatment. Take a matched pair of
observations i and j, and consider the logistic distribution F. The odds that the
individuals receive treatment are p(xi)=(1 p(xi)) and p(xj)=(1 p(xj)) so that











= exp[(ui   uj)]: (8)
If both individuals share the same observed covariates after propensity-score match-
ing, the x-vector cancels. The individuals nevertheless dier in their odds of re-
ceiving treatment by a factor that involves the parameter  and the dierence in
the unobserved variable u. It is the objective of sensitivity analysis to evaluate
how inference about the treatment eect is altered by changing the values of 
and (ui   uj).
Assume for the sake of simplicity that the unobserved covariate is an indicator
variable with ui 2 f0;1g (indicating the acquisition of an ownership advantage).
18Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a value of 20 is \large."
29Rosenbaum (2002) shows that equation (8) then implies the following bounds










The two matched individuals have the same probability of being treated only if
the odds ratio e = 1. If the odds ratio e = 2, then individuals who appear to be
similar (in terms of x), could dier in their odds of receiving the treatment by as
much as a factor of 2.
We compute critical values of the odds ratio e based on the Mantel and
Haenszel (1959) test statistic, as suggested by Rosenbaum (2002). The Mantel
and Haenszel test statistic assesses the strength of hidden bias that would be
necessary to overturn our ATT estimate.
The non-parametric Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test compares the successful
number of individuals in the treatment group to the same expected number under
the null hypothesis that the treatment eect is zero. Denote with N1s and N0s
the numbers of treated and non-treated individuals in stratum s, where Ns =
N0s + N1s. y1s is the number of treated individuals with a positive outcome
(survey participation), y0s is the number of non-treated individuals with a positive
outcome, and ys is the total number of positive outcomes in stratum s. The MH



















Our propensity-score matching procedure minimizes dierences between treat-
ment and control group observations so that the MH test (designed for random
samples) is applicable. Take the possible inuence of a binary hidden variable with
an eect e > 1 on the outcome. For xed e > 1, Rosenbaum (2002) shows that
the MH test statistic QMH can be bounded by two known distributions. If e = 1,
the bounds are equal to the baseline scenario of no hidden bias. With increasing
e, the bounds move apart, reecting uncertainty about the test statistic in the
presence of unobserved selection bias.
Consider two scenarios. First, let Q
+
MH be the test statistic given that we
overestimate the treatment eect and, second, let Q
 
MH the case where we under-
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s=1 V ar(e E 
s )
; (12)
where f Es and V ar(f Es) are the large sample approximations to the expectation
and variance of the number of successful participants when the hidden variable is
binary and  given.19
A.5 Training voucher and letter
19The large sample approximation to e E+
s is the unique root of the quadratic equation
e E2
s(e   1)   e Es[(e   1)(N1s + ys) + Ns] + eysN1s, after addition of max(0;ys + N1s   Ns 
f Es  min(ys;N1s)) to select the root. e E 
s follows by replacing e with 1=e. The large
sample approximation to the variance is V ar( e Es) = [1= e Es + 1=(ys   e Es) + 1=(N1s   e Es) +
1=(Ns   ys   N1s + e Es)] 1.




of the value of CHF 1500.- 
 
for the participation in continuous education 
valid until 31 May 2006 
 
The voucher can be redeemed on presentation of the filled-in confirmation of course 
participation. Several courses can be attended.  
 
Please send the voucher and the course participation by 31 July 2006 to: 
 
LINK Marketing Services 
Keyword: Voucher 
Spannortstrasse 7/9 
6000 Luzern 4 
 
 
The redemption of the voucher is voluntary. I agree with the statistical use of the information of the voucher, 
respectively with the confirmation of the course participation (without name) and the linkage of the 
information coming from the telephone interview and the Swiss Labor Force Survey.  
 
Place, Date: ……………………Signature:…………………….. 
 
 
Confirmation of course participation  1: 
 
We confirm, that Hanny Sample has attended the following course: 
 
Topic according to announcement…………………………………………………………….. 
 
From: …………….. to: ………………………………. 
 
Total of course lessons: …………………. 
 









Stamp and signature of the organiser: ………………………………………. 
More course confirmations on the backside  
 
Figure 2: 1500 CHF training voucher (English translation)
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9999 xlingen  
Neuchâtel, January 2006 
[15-04.20 BG/ AB ] 
 
 




Dear Mrs. Sample 
 
On behalf of the Swiss Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology (OPET) we 
send you today a voucher for one or several continuous training courses. The voucher is part 
of a new research project of the Federal government. In the attachment you will find 
explanations how to redeem the voucher.  
 
The Federal Statistical Office, on behalf of the OPET will be responsible for the statistical 
implementation of the project and data protection. You have been participating in the past in 
the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). This participation makes you particularly suited for 
this project. In the summer of 2006 you will be asked to participate in a telephone interview 
on employment and continuous education, carried out by the LINK institute on behalf of us. 
After the completion of the survey all connections between your name and your responses 
will be deleted. Our staff will only transmit the reports with the statistical results to the OPET, 
preserving absolute anonymity.  
 
Participation in this project is voluntary. However, for a good success of the project your 





If you have questions related to this project or this letter, please contact the Federal Statistical 













-  Voucher with confirmation of participation 
-  Explanation how to redeem the voucher 
 
 
Figure 3: Letter that was sent along with the voucher (English translation)
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